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I. BACKGROUND
Viacom v. YouTube (“Viacom v. YouTube”) has become the preeminent Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) 2 case of our day. Its looming decision may decide the
fate of the DMCA. On December 3, 2010 the case was appealed to challenge the scope of the
safe harbor provision and the red flag test for copyright infringing activities. 3 On June 23, 2010,
Judge Louis L. Stanton of the U.S. District Court of the Southern District of New York handed
down the original decision in Viacom v. YouTube finding that the defendant, YouTube, fell
within the scope of the safe harbor provision of the DMCA. 4 The court held that YouTube had
neither the actual nor the apparent knowledge that their website contained Viacom’s copyright
protected material. Therefore, YouTube was not liable for the $1 billion in damages Viacom
sought. 5 At trial, Viacom argued that YouTube was not only generally aware of, but welcomed,
copyright-infringing material to be uploaded onto their website. 6 Moreover, Viacom asserted
that this material increased viewership and hits for YouTube, which increased both the value of
the website and income from online advertisers. 7 YouTube attempted to defend itself from such
an assertion by highlighting that:
Viacom alone has uploaded thousands of videos to YouTube to market hundreds of
its programs and movies, including many that are now works in suit...Viacom does so for a
simple reason: this kind of marketing works. As a Viacom employee explained to The

2

The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1998).
Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 717 F.Supp.2d 514, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), appeal filed, No. 10-3270 (2nd Cir.
Dec. 3, 2010).
4
Id. at 529.
5
Id. at 529.
6
Id. at 518.
7
Id. at 518.
3
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Wall Street Journal: 'you almost can't find a better place than YouTube to promote your
movie.' 8

YouTube also cited to specific instances where upon direct notice of a particular item of
copyright infringement located on their website, they swiftly took all measures to remove such
item. 9 This case is centered on the issues of what type of “knowledge” YouTube, the Internet
Service Provider (“ISP”), had with regard to the infringing material contained on their website;
therefore making the issue on appeal: whether YouTube is entitled protection under the safe
harbor provision? 10
As the article will soon discuss, case law has demonstrated that the DMCA
notification procedure places the burden of policing copyright infringement on the
copyright owner and not the ISP. 11 Judge Louis L. Stanton had the initial opportunity to
shift this burden from the copyright owner to the provider, but chose not to do so. The
Court’s decision in the Southern District of New York found in favor of YouTube, ruling
that they were an ISP as defined under the DMCA, that they did not violate the red flag
test, and thus were protected from liability as a copyright infringer under the safe harbor
provision. The Court ultimately held that specific knowledge was necessary in order to be
held liable for damages to Viacom. 12

8

Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 39 Viacom Int'l, Inc. v.
YouTube, Inc., 717 F.Supp.2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 07-CV 3582), 2010 WL 1004562 at 23.
9
Id. at 519.
10
Id.
11
Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2007).
12
Id. at 525.
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II. INTRODUCTION
The Internet is an infant in comparison to the United States Constitution. Because of this,
trying to reconcile the two identities is somewhat of a difficult challenge in the context of our
modern day legal system. The Constitution was ratified at a time when even the period’s most
innovative fictional writers could not have contemplated the existence of something such as the
Internet. However, fast forward time two centuries, and the Internet is now a pervasive
technological force that is virtually impossible not to encounter in your everyday life. The
Internet is a worldwide system of interconnected computer networks with no central authority.
Due to its expansive nature, rapid rate of growth, volume of content, and degree of user-to-user
interconnectedness, it now poses a unique challenge to lawmakers in the United States. Since
the 1990’s, Congress has been struggling to gain control over rampant piracy and acts of
copyright infringement over the Internet. In an attempt to remedy the problem, Congress created
the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). 13 “The congressional determination to
promote electronic commerce and the distribution of digital works by providing copyright
owners with legal tools to prevent widespread piracy was tempered with concern for maintaining
the integrity of the statutory limitations on the exclusive rights of copyright owners” 14
Virtual content is constantly uploaded and sent out on the Internet; examples of such
content range from videos, to music, to simple creative stories. Try visualizing this: the Internet
is a bottomless pot. Everyday Internet users dump whatever ingredients they want into the pot.

13

The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1998).
Executive Summary Digital Millennium Copyright Act: Section 104 Report, COPYRIGHT.GOV,
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/dmca_executive.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2011). (emphasis added)
14
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The more ingredients added to the pot, the stronger and more fruitful it becomes. Once the
ingredients are added to the pot, all of the users now have access to these ingredients. There is
one problem, some of the users are putting ingredients into the pot do not have the proper
authority to do so. Have you ever heard the saying there are “too many cooks in the kitchen?”
As a result, the person who owns the right to that ingredient loses control over that right. By the
time this person realizes that their right to their ingredient has been violated it is too late and
millions of other users are already tasting their product. This illustration is exactly what is
occurring with the Internet and copyright owners.
A case addressing this exact issue is Viacom International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc. 15
Congress enacted the DMCA, containing a specific safe harbor provision granting copyright
infringement liability protection to companies categorized as “providers of Internet services”. 16
This provision protects these providers when third party users commit copyright infringement
while using their service. 17 For example, if AT&T were providing Internet service to a group of
people and an individual committed copyright infringement by downloading a song they did not
pay for on the AT&T Internet connection, AT&T would not be held liable for violating the
copyright owner’s rights to that song, assuming they meet the safe harbor provision. The case of
Viacom v. YouTube stems from the way the term Internet service provider has been interpreted
and applied to the landscape that the Internet is today.

15

18

Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 717 F.Supp.2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), appeal filed, No. 10-3270 (2nd Cir. Dec.
3, 2010).
16
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1998).
17
Id.
18
Id.
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Viacom, is a leading global entertainment group with brand and rights ownership for
MTV, CMT, Comedy Central, Nickelodeon, Spike, TV Land, VH1, BET and Paramount
Pictures to list a few. 19 YouTube was founded in 2005 and is a user-generated website where
individuals can upload clips of audio and visual content onto the Internet and share it with the
Internet via YouTube’s website. 20 YouTube does not charge its Internet users to access the
website and generates a majority of their income from online advertisements. 21 As of March 30,
2011, YouTube is the third most visited website on the Internet. 22 To get an idea of how much
YouTube is worth, on October 9, 2006, Google, Inc. announced that it was purchasing YouTube
for $1.65 billion in a stock-for-stock transition. 23 Presently contained on YouTube’s website are
user-generated video’s which allegedly infringe on the copyrights that Viacom owns. 24
YouTube is trying to claim protection under the DMCA as an ISP, while Viacom is claiming that
YouTube’s acts do not warrant the application of the safe harbor provision under the DMCA. 25
Ultimately, the Second Circuit must decide if YouTube should be held liable for “knowingly”
storing copyright infringed material.

19

About Viacom, VIACOM.COM, http://www.Viacom.com/aboutViacom/Pages/default.aspx, (last visited Feb. 7,
2011).
20
About YouTube, YOUTUBE , http://www.YouTube.com/t/about_YouTube (last visited Mar. 30, 2011).
21
Id.
22
Top Sites, ALEXA (Mar. 30, 2011), http://www.alexa.com/topsites/global.
23
Google To Acquire YouTube for $1.65 Billion in Stock, GOOGLE PRESS CENTER (Oct. 9, 2006)
http://www.google.com/press/pressrel/google_YouTube.html.
24
Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 717 F.Supp.2d 514, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), appeal filed, No. 10-3270 (2nd Cir.
Dec. 3, 2010).
25
Id.
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III. INTERNET EXPANSION AND COMPETING INTERESTS
Historically, the overall idea of a right connected to a creative work has deep origins.
William Blackstone pointed out in his Commentaries on the Law of England, that the idea of
maintaining some rights attached to a work of genius or invention traces back to Roman Law. 26
A copyright is, “the right to copy a work, specif., a property right in an original work of
authorship (including a literary, musical, dramatic, or other work) fixed in any tangible medium
of expression, giving the holder the exclusive right to reproduce, adapt, distribute, perform, and
display the work.” 27 It was England’s 1710 Statute of Anne that created what is considered to be
the world’s first copyright act. 28 This act granted publishers legal rights to the books they
printed. 29 The copyright protections set forth in the Statute of Anne did not apply to the thirteen
colonies. As a result, Joel Barlow, a prominent 18th century poet and diplomat, urged the
Continental Congress to grant rights to those who produced original, creative works. 30 In a letter
to the Continental Congress Barlow advocated for copyright protections:
[t]here is certainly no kind of property, in the nature of things, so much his
own, as the works which a person originates from his own creative
imagination: And when he has spent great part of his life in study, wasted
his time, his fortune & perhaps his health in improving his knowledge &
correcting his taste, it is a principle of natural justice that he should be
entitled to the profits arising from the sale of his works as a compensation

26

BLACKSTONE, WILLIAM, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: A FACSIMILE OF THE FIRST EDITION OF
1765--1769 (University of Chicago Press 1979) (1766), available at http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_8s3.html.
27
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1097 (8th ed. 2004).
28
Statute of Anne, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/26243/Statute-of-Anne. (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
29
Id.
30
PETER K. YU, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS 143
(Praeger Publishers) (2007).
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for his labor in producing them, & his risqué [sic] of reputation in offering
them to the Public. 31
Unfortunately, the Articles of Confederation did not confer power to the Continental Congress to
enact a copyright act, and it was not until the Constitutional Convention of 1787 that the United
States created a power in the government to issue copyrights. 32 Both James Madison of Virginia
and Charles Pickney of South Carolina advocated for copyright laws at the Constitutional
Convention and proposed that Congress be granted the power to issue copyrights. 33 This
proposal received a majority acceptance and was included in the Copyright and Patent Clause of
the United States Constitution. 34 This clause can be located in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of
the Constitution, most commonly known as the Copyright and Patent Clause (“the clause”). 35
The clause confers power upon the United States Congress, “[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” 36
Congress first exercised the powers granted to them under the clause, with the
enactment of the 1790 Federal Copyright Act. 37 From the creation of this act to the present,

31

Letter from Joel Barlow, to Elias Boudinot, President of the U.S Continental Congress (Jan. 10, 1783) (on file
with the National Archives), available at http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgibin/kleioc/0010/exec/showTranscription/%22us_1783b%22/start/%22yes%22.
32
PETER K. YU, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS 142
(Praeger Publishers) (2007).
33
Id. at 142.
34
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl 8.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
United States Copyright Office: A Brief Introduction and History, COPYRIGHT.GOV,
http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ1a.html, (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
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federal copyright laws have greatly expanded and now include the granting of rights to creative
works including but not limited to literature, music, art and film. 38
It is evident from the clause that copyright laws were of some importance to the
founding fathers of this nation; however, it is doubtful that our founding fathers could have
foreseen copyright laws acting as a potential roadblock to Internet innovation. In MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., v. Grokster, Ltd. (“Grokster”), the Supreme Court of the United
States observed that there is a “sound balance between the respective values or supporting
creative pursuits through copyright protection and promoting innovation in new communication
technologies by limiting the incidence of liability for copyright infringement.” 39 The Court went
on to highlight that, “[t]he more artistic protection is favored, the more technological innovation
may be discouraged; the administration of copyright law is an exercise in managing the
tradeoff.” 40 Nearly six years after Grokster was settled, the struggle between copyright holders
and technological innovators still exists and is stronger than ever before.

IV.

WHAT IS THE PROBLEM?
Around the time that Congress was debating the terms and scope of the DMCA, they

were faced with the dilemma of protecting the rights of copyright owners and technological
innovation and expansion. From 1995 to 2000 the rapid growth of the Internet coincided with

38

Id.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 928 (2005).
40
Id. at 927.
39
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the speculative business bubble known as the “dot-com bubble”. 41 There were various
companies that were providers of Internet service, allowing personal computer users to access
the Internet for a fee. In order to efficiently provide Internet service and transmit electronically
stored information to and from its many individual users, the Internet providers themselves had
to maintain control over the electronic information uploaded by third party users on its own main
servers. As a result, some of the information held by the Internet providers consisted of
copyright protected works. The ISP having unauthorized copyrighted works stored on their
servers and then distributing them to individual users constitutes copyright infringement. In
American copyright law, there are two different kinds of infringement – (1) Direct Infringement:
which is the exclusive copying of one’s copyright by another 42 and (2) Indirect Infringement:
which can be broken into two types: contributory and vicarious infringement. 43 Contributory
infringement occurs when a party other than the direct infringer is aware of the direct
infringement and they substantially participate in the infringement. 44 Vicarious infringement
occurs when there has been a direct infringement and the person other than the direct infringer
has the ability to control the direct infringer. 45 By result of the infringement the vicarious
infringer derives some benefit. 46

41

Here’s Why the Dot Com Bubble Began and Why it Popped, BUSINESS INSIDER MONEY GAME, (Dec. 15, 2010)
http://www.businessinsider.com/heres-why-the-dot-com-bubble-began-and-why-it-popped-2010-12.
42
Legal Protection of Digital Information: Chapter 1 An Overview of Copyright, COPYRIGHT 101, http://digital-lawonline.info/lpdi1.0/treatise14.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2011).
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
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The United States Supreme Court case Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios (“Sony”) addressed this problem of liability for a device or mechanism that serves both
non-infringing and infringing uses. 47 The respondents in Sony brought a copyright infringement
action against manufactures of home videotape recorders (“VTR”) alleging that “VTR
consumers had been recording some of respondents’ copyrighted works that had been exhibited
on commercially sponsored television and thereby infringed [their] copyrights, and further that
petitioners were liable for such copyright infringement because of their marketing of VTR’s.” 48
In the Supreme Court’s holding Justice Stevens asserted,
That manufacturers of home videotape recorders demonstrated a significant
likelihood that substantial numbers of copyright holders who licensed their
works for broadcast on free television would not object to having their
broadcasts time shifted by private viewers and owners of copyrights on
television programs failed to demonstrate that time shifting would cause any
likelihood of non-minimal harm to the potential market for, or the value of,
their copyrighted works and therefore home videotape recorder was capable of
substantial non-infringing uses; thus, manufacturers' sale of such equipment to
general public did not constitute contributory infringement of respondents'
copyrights. 49

The Court’s reasoning in Sony can be effectively applied as a justification for the safe harbor
provision in limiting ISPs’ contributory liability. Because ISPs have substantial non-infringing
uses, similar to VTRs, they should not automatically be held liable for contributory infringement.
However, when ISPs have knowledge of infringing use of their service they may no longer be
immune from contributory liability.

47

Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
Id.
49
Id. at 418.
48
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V. WHO ARE THE SERVICE PROVIDERS?
For a party to be exempt from copyright infringement liability under the safe harbor
provision of the DMCA the party must be a service provider. 50 A service provider is
defined under §512(k)(1)(A) of the DMCA as “an entity offering the transmission, routing,
or providing of connections for digital online communications, between or among points
specified by a user, of material of the user’s choosing, without modification of the content
of the material as sent or received.” 51 Simply put, an ISP is a provider of “online services
or network access, or the operator of facilities therefore.” 52 From a textualist perspective,
the definition of a service provider is extremely narrow. However, since the creation of the
DMCA the courts have repeatedly interpreted the term “service provider” broadly. An
example of such occurred in Viacom v. YouTube. 53 In Viacom v. YouTube, the Court did
not find an issue as to whether or not YouTube fell under the definition of a service
provider. 54 The decision simply quoted the statute and conclusively asserted that,
“YouTube is a service provider for purposes of § 512(c).” 55 An issue can be raised as to
whether or not this court and previous courts were correct in finding YouTube as a service
provider. “Under the standard definition, many websites may not be considered service
providers, but under the judicially-interpreted statutory definition, courts have trouble

50

See The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (1998).
Id. at § 512(k)(1)(A).
52 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998: U.S. Copyright Office Summary, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE
(Dec. 1998), http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf.
53
See Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 717 F.Supp.2d 514, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), appeal filed, No. 10-3270 (2nd
Cir. Dec. 3, 2010).
54
See id.
55
Id.
51
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imagining the existence of an online service that would not fall under the definitions.” 56 In
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., Perfect 10 argued that Cybernet was not eligible
for protection under the safe harbor provision. Cybernet offered an age verification
program that websites such as Perfect 10, would use in order for their users to show proof
of age and thereby gain access to a website. 57 Perfect 10 took a narrow approach arguing,
that section 512(c) was drafted with the limited purpose of protecting Internet
infrastructure services in mind. It contends that the definition for a provider of online
services or network access does not include services that ‘participate in the selection or
screening of that data or take an interest in the content of that data. 58

But the court refused to accept this definition and applied a broader explanation of a
service provider. 59 The courts have since taken the narrow definition of a service provider
set forth in the DMCA, and interpreted the definition to incorporate almost any website on
the Internet that stores, sends or receives electronic information but does not modify the
information. 60 It is arguable as to whether the Perfect 10 Court’s definition of a service
provider is a good or a bad decision.
From the DMCA, the courts have found that a service provider includes any of the
four following activities:

56

Jason Breen, YouTube or Youlose: Can YouTube Survive a Copyright Infringement Lawsuit?, 16 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 151, 163 (2007).
57
Perfect 10, Inc. v Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1175 (C.D. Cal 2002).
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
See Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp 2d 1082, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2001); see also Corbis Corp. v.
Amazon.com Inc, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1100 (W.D. Wash. 2004).

37

38
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1. Transitory communication;
2. System caching;
3. Storage of information on systems or networks at the direction of users; or
4. Information location tools. 61

From the activities listed YouTube appears to be a website that engages in the third
conduct - storage of information on systems or networks at the direction of users. 62
Viacom v. YouTube describes YouTube as a website operated by Google “which users
may upload video files free of charge.” 63 The opinion further holds that, “[u]ploaded files
are copied and formatted by YouTube’s computer systems, and then made available for
viewing on YouTube.” 64 The opinion indicates that approximately twenty-four hours
worth of video material is uploaded onto YouTube every minute. 65 YouTube’s
functionality relies on the direction of its users. 66 Based on the court’s broad interpretation
of a service provider and YouTube’s basic functions as a website, YouTube is and was
correctly found to be a service provider.
Once an entity has met the qualifications to be classified as a service provider under
the DMCA, the service provider can only be immune from copyright infringement

61 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998: U.S. Copyright Office Summary, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE
(Dec. 1998), http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf.
62
See YouTube, YOUTUBE, http://www.YouTube.com/, (last visited Feb. 5, 2011).
63
Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 717 F.Supp.2d 514, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), appeal filed, No. 10-3270 (2nd Cir.
Dec. 3, 2010).
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
See YouTube, YOUTUBE, http://www.YouTube.com/, (last visited Feb. 5, 2011).
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occurring through the use of its service by meeting the standards set forth under the safe
harbor provision of section 512(i) of the DMCA. 67 The service provider must also: (1)
adopt and reasonably implement a policy of terminating in appropriate circumstances the
accounts of subscribers who are repeat [copyright] infringers; and (2) accommodate and
not interfere with ‘standard technical measures.’ 68
In Ellison v. Robertson, the court subdivided condition (1), the repeat infringer
policy, into three requirements for a service provider. 69 The service provider must: (1)
adopt a policy that provides for the termination of service access for repeat copyright
infringers in appropriate circumstances; (2) implement that policy in a reasonable manner;
and (3) inform its subscribers of the policy.” 70
Condition (2), standard technical measures, has been defined as, “measures that
copyright owner[s] use to identify or protect copyrighted works, that have been developed
pursuant to a broad consensus of copyright owners and service providers in an open, fair
and voluntary multi-industry process, are available to anyone on reasonable
nondiscriminatory terms, and do not impose substantial costs or burdens on service
providers.” 71

67

The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(i) (1998).
68 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998: U.S. Copyright Office Summary, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE
(Dec. 1998), http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf.
69
Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2004).
70
Jason Breen, YouTube or Youlose: Can YouTube Survive a Copyright Infringement Lawsuit?, 16 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 151, 161 (2007); quoting Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2004).
71 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998: U.S. Copyright Office Summary, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE
(Dec. 1998), http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf.
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However, just fitting the mold of an ISP and qualifying for protection under the safe
harbor provision of the DMCA, does not necessarily shield an ISP from liability. 72 In order
for YouTube to receive continuous protection from the safe harbor provision, the following
three conditions must be met:
1. The provider must not have the requisite level of knowledge of the infringing activity;

2. If the provider has the right and ability to control the infringing activity, it must not
receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity; and

3. Upon receiving proper notification of claimed infringement, the provider must
expeditiously take down or block access to the material. 73

The first condition is discussed in section 512(c)(1)(A) of the DMCA, the safe
harbor provision. It limits an ISP’s protection under the safe harbor provision based on the
ISP’s knowledge of copyright infringing material on their system or network. 74 Section
512(c)(1)(A) provides:
(1) In general. — A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or,
except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for
infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that

72

See The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(i) (1998).
73 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998: U.S. Copyright Office Summary, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE
(Dec. 1998), http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf; See The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17
U.S.C. § 512(c) (1998).
74
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A) (1998).

2011

THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT

resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider, if the
service provider (A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the
material on the system or network is infringing;
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances
from which infringing activity is apparent; or
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or
disable access to, the material; 75

This provision can be broken down into three independent prongs: (1) Actual
knowledge; (2) Apparent knowledge; and (3) Expeditious removal. 76 The first prong,
actual knowledge, has been interpreted narrowly to mean knowledge of specific infringing
material. 77 A general knowledge of infringing material residing on one’s site does not
seem to be enough. A court has yet to set a defined standard as to when an ISP has actual
knowledge absent the failure to take down specific infringing material upon receiving
notification. 78 It has not been suggested that service providers have the affirmative duty to
search for infringing material. 79

75

The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A) (1998).
Jason Breen, YouTube or Youlose: Can YouTube Survive a Copyright Infringement Lawsuit?, 16 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 151, 161 (2007); See The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i) (1998).
77
See The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i) (1998); Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com,
Inc., 351 F.Supp. 2d 1090, 1100 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
78
Jason Breen, YouTube or Youlose: Can YouTube Survive a Copyright Infringement Lawsuit?, 16 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 151, 164 (2007).
79
Id; See Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1100 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
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Before discussing the second prong, the third prong, expeditious removal, simply
requires the service provider to create a “take-down” system. 80 Upon being notified that
infringing material is on their site, an ISP must “expeditiously” remove the material from
the network. Additionally, Section 512(c)(2) requires the service provider to create a
“designated agent” that allows copyright owners to notify the agent of such infringed
copyright material. 81 YouTube has proven to satisfy its duties under the “take-down”
system, as well as, doing their part in providing an agent where notifications can be sent. 82
In Viacom v. YouTube, Viacom recognized the fact that YouTube would remove their
infringed material upon being notified by Viacom. 83
The second prong, apparent knowledge, requires that in the absence of actual
knowledge, the ISP be unaware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is
apparent. 84 It is this prong that has become known as the “red flag” test. 85 The test can be
divided more easily into two parts, a subjective part and an objective part: (1) was the
service provider aware of infringing material and (2) whether infringing activity would
have been apparent to a reasonable person operating under the same or similar
circumstances. 86 If the answer is yes to either part then the ISP had apparent knowledge.

80

See The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) (1998).
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82
See Copyright Infringement Notification, YOUTUBE, http://www.YouTube.com/t/dmca_policy, (last visited Feb.
6, 2011).
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Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 717 F.Supp.2d 514, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), appeal filed, No. 10-3270 (2nd Cir.
Dec. 3, 2010).
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See Liliana Chang, The Red Flag Test for Apparent Knowledge Under the DMCA § 512(c) Safe Harbor, 28
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There has been some public criticism concerning the applicability of the red flag test.
Depending on the court’s interpretation of the red flag test YouTube could be held liable.
Critics have suggested that Viacom v. YouTube has rendered the red flag test useless and
essentially equivalent to the “actual knowledge” prong. 87 Their observation is a valid one.
Apparent knowledge has never been found through the red flag test. 88 When applying the
test generally, YouTube undoubtedly knows that infringing material is uploaded onto their
site. Under this simple application of the red flag test YouTube should have been liable.
The court did not use this application.
Another criticism of the Viacom v. YouTube decision has been its interpretation of
section 512(c)(1)(B). This section of the safe harbor provision states that an ISP is
protected from liability if it “does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the
infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to
control such activity.” 89 The court in Viacom v. YouTube found that in order to invoke the
“financial benefit argument” the ISP needed knowledge, actual or apparent, of infringing
activity. 90 The language of the statute does not clearly prescribe that knowledge first be
proven. However, the court’s interpretation seems logical. It would be difficult to find an
infringement case where the service provider had not been financially benefiting.
Therefore, the court in Viacom v. YouTube made the best decision when determining that

87

See Scott A. Zebrak, Viacom v.YouTube: a missed opportunity, THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL (July 26, 2010),
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202463839409&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1.
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Liliana Chang, The Red Flag Test for Apparent Knowledge Under the DMCA § 512(c) Safe Harbor, 28 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 195, 203 (2010).
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The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) (1998).
90
Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 717 F.Supp.2d 514, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), appeal filed, No. 10-3270 (2nd Cir.
Dec. 3, 2010).
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the service provider must have knowledge (actual or apparent) to be found liable for
financial gain from infringing activity.
Section 512(c)(1)(C) of the safe harbor provision merely re-establishes the “takedown” requirement upon notification of the claimed infringement. 91 The provision states,
“upon notification of claimed infringement…responds expeditiously to remove, or disable
access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing
activity.” 92 It is an important part of the safe harbor statute but is irrelevant for this
discussion. The most troubling issue with the DMCA safe harbor provision rests in the
knowledge prongs of the statute.

VI. CASES DEALING WITH THE DMCA & SAFE HARBOR PROVISION

The recent case history pertaining to the knowledge prongs have paved the way for
Viacom v. YouTube. Some of the most influential holdings on this issue include, (1)
Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc. 93, (2) Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 94,
Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC., 95 (3) Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, 96 (4) Arista
Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC 97. Tiffany and Perfect 10 raised the knowledge
threshold that a service provider must have with regard to the acts of copyright
infringement and outlined the precautionary measures that a service provider must take in

91

The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C) (1998).
Id.
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Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2nd Cir. 2010).
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order to be protected under the safe harbor provision of the DMCA. 98 Distinguished from
the outcome in Viacom v. YouTube, both Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd. and Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com were cases where the court ruled against the
service provider and did not grant them protection from the DMCA’s safe harbor
provision. 99

1. Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc.
eBay is the proprietor of www.eBay.com, an Internet-based marketplace that allows
those who register with it to purchase goods from and sell goods to others. 100 As of early
2011, eBay was the twenty-fifth most visited website in the United States. 101 eBay
provides the venue for the sale of the goods but does not do the selling of the goods
themselves nor does it ever actually have physical possession of the goods. 102 At any given
time eBay contains some 100 million listings. 103 eBay generates revenue by charging
sellers to use its listing services and by owning and processing purchases through
Paypal. 104 Ultimately, eBay’s revenue is directly correlated to the volume of goods it has
listed and sold on its website.
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Cir. 2007).
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913 (2005).
100
Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 96 (2nd Cir. 2010).
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Tiffany is a world-famous branded jewelry seller. 105 Prior to 2004, Tiffany became
aware that its counterfeit merchandise was being sold on eBay. 106 Tiffany conducted
several surveys and tests which discovered that a significant portion of the alleged
authentic “Tiffany” sterling-silver jewelry listed on the eBay website was counterfeit. 107 It
was suggested that eBay knew that some portion of the “Tiffany” goods sold on its website
might be counterfeit while some were also authentic. 108 Because eBay facilitated the sale
of authentic and counterfeit Tiffany’s goods, it accumulated substantial revenue from the
sales. It was reported that eBay earned $4.1 million in revenue from completed listings
with “Tiffany” in the listing title. 109 Although counterfeit Tiffany’s jewelry was sold on
eBay, this is not to say that eBay did not take precautions to keep counterfeit merchandise
off their website. The Second Circuit found that eBay had taken the following precautions:
·
·
·

·

105

Id.
Id. at 97.
107
Id. at 97.
108
Id. at 98.
109
Id. at 98.
110
Id. at 98.
111
Id. at 98.
112
Id. at 99.
113
Id. at 99.
106

Spends $20 million each year on tools to promote trust and safety on
its website. 110
Created a “Fraud Engine” for the purpose of ferreting out illegal
listings. 111
Established the “Verified Rights Owner (VERO) Program” a notice
and takedown system allowing the owners of IP rights (i.e. Tiffany,
Inc.) to report to eBay any listing offering of potentially infringing
items. 112
Maintains “About Me” pages on the website to inform eBay users
about their products’ Intellectual Property rights and legal
positions.113
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Suspends hundreds of thousands of sellers every year for engaging in
infringing activity. 114

While eBay attempted to reduce the sale of counterfeit items on its website, it also
actively sought to promote the sales of premium and branded jewelry through
advertisements and promotions that contained hyperlinks to the eBay website, some of
which contained images of Tiffany merchandise. 115 eBay also purchased sponsored-link
advertisements on various search engines to promote the availability of Tiffany items on its
website. 116
Tiffany initiated the action against eBay on July 15, 2004, alleging that eBay’s
conduct facilitating and advertising the sale of “Tiffany” goods which later turned out to
be counterfeit constituted direct and contributory trademark infringement, trademark
dilution and false advertising. 117 On July 14, 2008, following a bench trial, the district
court found in favor of eBay on all claims. 118 Tiffany appealed from the district court’s
judgment for eBay. 119 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed
the judgment of the district court with respect to the claims of trademark infringement and
dilution and remanded the case to the district court on the issue of false advertising. 120
The parties focused their attention on the issue of contributory trademark
infringement for culpably facilitating the infringing conduct of the counterfeiting
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Id. at 100.
Id.
116
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Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.
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Id.
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vendors. 121 According to common law, contributory infringement occurs when “a
manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark, or if it
continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in
trademark infringement, the manufacturer or distributor is contributory liable for any harm
done as a result of the deceit.” 122 This language is very similar to the red flag knowledge
conditions contained in the DMCA safe harbor provision. The issue the court faced in
Tiffany regarding this language turned upon the fact that it was ill-defined and did not layout which acts constitute contributory trademark infringement. 123 Additionally, there was
limited case law to guide the court in its decision.
In order to render a decision, the court used a test set forth in Inwood Laboratories,
Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc. 124 Inwood held that a provider is liable if either the provider
“intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark” or the provider “continues to supply
to one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement.” 125
Tiffany argued that eBay continued to supply it services to its users with reason to know
that some of the items sold by these users were counterfeit. The district court ultimately
concluded, which the Second Circuit later affirmed, that to hold eBay liable for
contributory infringement, Tiffany would have to show that eBay “knew or had reason to
know of specific instances of actual infringement” beyond those that it addressed upon

121

Id. at 103.
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notification.” 126 “A service provider must have more than a general knowledge or reason
to know that its service is being used to sell counterfeit goods. Some contemporary
knowledge of which particular listings are infringing or will infringe in the future is
necessary.” 127 The requirement of specific knowledge in Tiffany resembles closely to the
actual knowledge requirement found in the DMCA and in the Viacom v. YouTube district
court decision.
In Viacom v. YouTube, Judge Stanton addresses Tiffany in his decision. Both
cases raise the question as to the liability of the service provider for the actions of its third
party users. eBay and YouTube are both primarily user-generated websites. Tiffany and
Viacom are both companies whose property rights were infringed by third-party users of
the service providers. The difference between Tiffany and Viacom v. YouTube lies in the
causes of actions brought by the plaintiffs. In Tiffany, eBay was sued for trademark
infringement while in Viacom, YouTube was sued for copyright infringement. Judge
Stanton wrote:
Although a different technique, the DMCA applies the same principle, and its
establishment of a safe harbor is clear and practical: if a service provider knows (from
notice from the owner or a “red flag”) of specific instances of infringement, the provider
must promptly remove the infringing material. If not, the burden is on the owner to

126
127

Id. at 103.
Id. at 107.
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identify the infringement. General knowledge that infringement is ‘ubiquitous’ does not
impose a duty on the service provider to monitor or search its service for infringements. 128

Judge Stanton’s holding in Viacom v. YouTube, reaffirms the ruling in Tiffany by
leaving the burden of policing infringement to the intellectual property owner. Like
YouTube, eBay’s primary purpose as a service provider has been protected but it has left
the trademark owner, Tiffany, without a remedy.

2. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster
In 2003, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios along with various motion picture studios,
recording companies, songwriters, and music publishers, collectively to be referred to as
“MGM”, brought suit against two peer-to-peer (“P2P”) software owners, Grokster, Ltd., and
StreamCast Networks, Inc., collectively to be referred to as “Grokster”. 129 MGM alleged that
Grokster was liable for acts of copyright infringement by knowingly promoting the use of their
software programs to their users to infringe copyrights. 130 The United States District Court for
the Central District of California held that the users of Grokster directly infringed MGM’s
copyrights by downloading copyrighted media files using Grokster’s software program, but that
Grokster was not directly liable because they did not have actual knowledge as to the specific
acts of infringement. 131 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the

128

Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 717 F.Supp.2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), appeal filed, No. 10-3270 (2nd
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district court’s holding, finding the decentralized structure of Grokster’s software programs
rendered them incapable of having actual knowledge of the infringement activity from their
software users and thus were not vicariously liable. 132 In 2004, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to review the case and in a vote of 7-0, the Court unanimously reversed the
lower courts’ findings, granting summary judgment in favor of MGM. 133 Overall, the issue
facing the Court in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., v. Grokster, was, “[u]nder what
circumstances is a distributor of a product, where the product is capable of both a lawful and
unlawful use, liable for acts of copyright infringement by third parties who use the product?” 134
In MGM v. Grokster, the defendant parties did not assert a defense under the DMCA. Even if
Grokster qualified as a service provider under the DMCA and were able to invoke legal
protections under the DMCA’s safe harbor provision, Grokster likely would have been found
guilty of contributory liability for copyright infringement. There was evidence that Grokster
took active steps to induce infringement by its users through advertisements and failed to
develop a filtering tool to diminish the infringing activity produced from use of their software. 135
The district court in Viacom v. YouTube distinguished YouTube from Grokster, stating that
YouTube did not exist “solely to provide the site and facilities for copyright infringement.” 136
While, in MGM v. Grokster the court held that Grokster’s P2P software programs “aimed to
have a larger number of copyrighted songs available on their networks than other file-sharing
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networks” and “sent users a newsletter promoting its ability to provide particular, popular
copyrighted materials.” 137
One reason that Viacom v. YouTube came out in favor of the ISP while MGM v.
Grokster came out in favor of the copyright holders was because of how YouTube dealt with the
notification and knowledge of infringing uses of their product. While it can be said that both
YouTube and Grokster financially benefitted from third party individuals using their services to
engage in copyright infringement YouTube has a system where an agent receives complaints of
infringement and removes identified material when they learn of the infringement. 138 YouTube
complied with the DMCA and qualified for protection under the Safe Harbor Provision. 139
Conversely, Grokster “never blocked anyone from continuing to use its software to share
copyrighted files. Grokster not only rejected another company’s offer to help monitor
infringement, but blocked the Internet Protocol addresses of entities it believed were trying to
engage in such monitoring on its networks.” 140
What is difficult to reconcile between MGM v. Grokster and Viacom v. YouTube is the
prevalence of infringement. Based on a study commissioned by MGM, nearly 90% of the files
available for download using Grokster’s software P2P programs were copyrighted works. 141 In,
Viacom v. YouTube, it was alleged at trial that “over twenty-four hours of new video-viewing
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time is uploaded to the YouTube website every minute” 142 and Viacom contends that “tens of
thousands of videos on YouTube, resulting in hundreds of millions of views, were taken
unlawfully from Viacom’s copyrighted works without authorization.” 143 It is hard to deny that
YouTube does not know the extent to which their own website is abused by third party users in
uploading and sharing copyrighted material. If all that separates the acts of Grokster and the acts
of YouTube are a few advertisements soliciting copyrighted works and an infringement
notification system, it is difficult to understand why the district court found that YouTube passed
the red flag test.

3. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC
In 2007, Perfect 10 brought an action against an ISP claiming that the ISP allowed
consumers to pay for subscriptions or memberships to e-commerce venues that violated
Perfect 10’s copyrights and trademarks. 144 Perfect 10 is a publisher of an adult
entertainment magazine and the owner of a website, perfect10.com. 145 Perfect10.com is a
subscription based website where consumers pay a membership fee in order to gain access
to the website’s content. 146 It holds registered U.S. copyrights for the images they
display. 147

142

Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 717 F.Supp.2d 514, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), appeal filed, No. 10-3270 (2nd
Cir. Dec. 3, 2010).
143
Id.
144
Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, 488 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2007).
145
Id. at 1108.
146
Id.
147
Id.

54

PACE I.P., SPORTS & ENTERTAINMENT LAW FORUM

[VOL. 1

The defendant, CCBill, allows consumers to pay for subscriptions or memberships
to e-commerce venues that included sites such as “illegal.net” and
“stolencelebritypics.com.” 148 Some of these websites infringed upon Perfect 10’s
copyrights. For example, if a consumer wanted to view pictures on one of these websites,
the viewer would be directed to CCBill to make a payment. 149 Upon completion of the
transaction, the consumer would be redirected to the website, where they would have full
access to view the pictures. 150 Perfect 10 argued that since CCBill collected payment for
access to certain websites that it knew were infringing on Perfect 10’s copyrights and
trademarks it should be held liable. 151 Perfect 10 claimed that the defendants had apparent
knowledge of the infringing activities because CCBill directed its consumers to websites
such as, “illegal.net” and “stolencelebritypics.com” which they knew to contain Perfect
10’s copyrighted images. 152
CCBill countered by stating that it was a third party and therefore their actions fell
under the safe harbor provision provided by the DMCA. 153 To garner safe harbor
protection, the Ninth Circuit first determined that the ISP must have a reasonably
implemented repeat offender policy. 154 Since “reasonably implemented” is not defined, the
Ninth Circuit found that an ISP “implements” a policy if it has a working notification
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system. 155 This notification system is designed to handle complaints made by the
copyright owner to take down infringing material. The Court determined that an ISP does
not have an “implemented” system if it prevents copyright holders from providing DMCA
complaint-notifications. 156 The Ninth Circuit concluded that CCBill implemented a
DMCA-complaint notification system although there was evidence that it was completed in
a careless manner. 157 The Ninth Circuit only requires the ISP to act “expeditiously to
remove, or disable access to, the material” when it (1) has actual knowledge (2) is aware of
facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent, or (3) has received
notification of claimed infringement meeting the requirements of section 512(c)(A). 158
This ruling is important because it holds the ISP to a relatively low standard.
The second determination in this case was based on the “red flag” test and whether
CCBill had knowledge of the infringing activity. In order for CCBill to fit under the “red
flag” test it would need to be apparent that the website instructed or enabled users to
infringe another's copyright. 159 A service provider may also lose protection if it fails to
take action with regard to infringing material when it is “aware of facts or circumstances
from which infringing activity is apparent.” 160 In this case, Perfect 10 argued that CCBill
was aware of a number of “red flags” that signaled apparent infringement because CCBill
provided services to “illegal.net” and “stolencelebritypics.com,” which made available
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Perfect 10 copyrighted images. 161 The Court disagreed, finding these websites to be
“titillating by nature, describing photographs as ‘illegal’ or ‘stolen’ may be an attempt to
increase their salacious appeal, rather than an admission that the photographs are actually
illegal or stolen.” 162 This holding is important because the court further softened the ISP’s
burden of determining whether the material it hosts is infringing on the copyright owner.
The court relied upon this case in Viacom v. YouTube because it furthered defined
the knowledge requirement under the DMCA’s safe harbor provision. Like Perfect 10,
YouTube’s “[m]ere knowledge of prevalence of such [infringing] activity in general is not
enough.” 163 In fact, the burden of determining whether there is infringing activity remains
with the copyright owner, not the ISP. In Viacom v. YouTube, the Plaintiffs claim that
“tens of thousands of videos on YouTube, resulting in hundreds of millions of views, were
taken unlawfully from Viacom's copyrighted works without authorization.” 164 Viacom also
alleged that “[d]efendants had ‘actual knowledge’ and were ‘aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity [was] apparent,’ but failed to do anything. 165
Like Perfect 10, the Second Circuit seems to favor the ISP because the ISP does not have
“the burden of determining whether photographs are actually illegal.” 166 Moreover, the
reasonableness standard places a heavy burden on the copyright owners to prove that the
ISP had actual knowledge of the infringement. The Southern District of New York’s ruling
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in Viacom v. YouTube stays consistent with the decision in Perfect 10, reasoning that
stringent requirements 167 are not yet needed for ISPs. 168

4. Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com & Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group
This suit began in October of 2007 when the Recording Artist Association of
America (“RIAA”) sued Usenet.com and their sole shareholder Gerald Reynolds for
allowing users to pay a fee to download illegally stored copyrighted material. 169 In 2009,
Arista Records also filed suit against Usenet.com (“Usenet”) alleging that Usenet engaged
in acts of direct infringement of the exclusive right of distribution, inducement of copyright
infringement, contributory copyright infringement, and vicarious copyright
infringement. 170 On June 30, 2009, the Southern District of New York granted summary
judgment for the RIAA in its case against Usenet holding that Usenet was liable for direct,
contributory, and vicarious copyright infringement. 171
The Usenet system was developed over twenty years ago as a global (online)
bulletin board which users could post and read messages. 172 The Usenet domain was
purchased by Sierra in 1998 and later developed into a website where individuals could pay
a fee of up to $18.95/month in order to download a set number of copyrighted music,
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movies and pictures. 173 Usenet was able to obtain some of the copyright protected material
by paying its users to access their data and store it on their own devices. 174
It was undisputed that Usenet’s site was used primarily for obtaining copyright
protected works, some of which were material owned by Arista Records. 175 Usenet
engaged in direct infringement by paying subscribers to download and upload music files,
which would be stored as “Usage Data” and could then be downloaded by other paying
customers. 176
Arista alleged that Usenet directly infringed their copyrights by distributing copies
of Arista’s musical works to its website subscribers. To establish a claim of copyright
infringement, a plaintiff must establish (1) ownership of a valid copyright and (2)
unauthorized copying or a violation of one of the other exclusive rights afforded copyright
owners pursuant to the Copyright Act (granting a copyright owner the exclusive right to
distribute copies…of the copyrighted work to the public or other transfer of ownership). 177
The Court in Arista relied on Cartoon Network LLLP v. CSC Holdings Inc., 178 in
formulating the standards to determine when a service provider is guilty of direct copyright
infringement. The court in Cartoon held that a service provider cannot be guilty for direct
infringement where the provider’s service acts as a mere “passive conduit” for delivery of
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works requested by its users. 179 However, an ISP can be held liable if the provider engaged
in volitional conduct supporting copyright infringement. 180 The court in Usenet found that
Usenet engaged in this exact volitional conduct supporting copyright infringement and
therefore converted their status as passive service providers protected under the safe harbor
provision into active participants in the process of copyright infringement. 181
Arista also brought claims against Usenet for secondary liability for (1) inducement
of copyright infringement, (2) contributory copyright infringement and (3) vicarious
copyright infringement. 182 The court ruled against Usenet on the claim of secondary
liability for inducement of copyright infringement finding that:
Defendants’ subscribers committed direct infringement of the Plaintiffs’ exclusive
right of reproduction by downloading copies of Plaintiffs’ works from Defendants’ service,
thereby creating copies of the works on their computers without Plaintiffs’ authorization. 183

With respect to the claim of contributory copyright infringement, Usenet asserted
the “multiple uses” defense alleged by Sony in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
Studios. 184 The court however rejected Usenet’s defense and granted summary judgment
for Arista on the claim of contributory copyright infringement. 185 Arista’s motion for
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summary judgment on vicarious liability was also granted. 186 In this case, the service
provider took active steps to engage and promote copyright infringement by it users. Both
Arista and Grokster can be distinguished from Viacom v. YouTube in this regard. While
Viacom has alleged that YouTube has apparent knowledge of the alleged copyright
infringement acts by its users, Viacom has not alleged that YouTube has had actual
knowledge of the infringement related activities and then not taken active steps to remedy
the problem. What remains a question on appeal is the volitional conduct standard applied
in Arista. YouTube’s knowledge of third party infringers, although not specific, is
nonetheless knowledge enough to know that infringement is taking place. This standard
may prove to be a linchpin in Viacom’s appeal.

VII.

FUTURE SOLUTIONS

1. Substantial Precautions as a Reason for No Liability
Due to the makeup of the Internet, the likelihood of copyright infringement
continuing to occur is extremely high. In many situations, such as in the case of Viacom v.
YouTube, it is not the service provider that is doing the infringing but a third party user.
There is only so much a service provider can do to protect itself from a lawsuit.
A potential solution to the ongoing problem of third-party Internet copyright
infringement would be to raise the threshold of required precautions an ISP must make in
order to prevent copyright infringement. A good example of an ISP engaging in such
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protective measures is found in Tiffany v. eBay. In Tiffany, one of the most heavily
weighed factors the court considered was the time, effort, and expenses eBay put into
preventing trademark infringement. 187 The court opined eBay’s precautionary tactics,
which could be interpreted as praising eBay for good behavior. 188 Overall, courts seem to
come down generously on ISPs who exercise good faith in preventing intellectual property
infringement by third parties on their sites. 189
This is not an assertion that this solution will stop infringement altogether, but it
will force ISPs to make a good faith effort to reduce the infringing activities. Currently,
YouTube takes a number of precautions against infringement and it is not unreasonable to
describe them as a good example to newer ISPs. Any user can visit the YouTube site and
find the link to its “copyright” page on the bottom of the home screen. 190 After clicking the
link, a user is immediately directed to YouTube’s “take-down” policy and directions. 191
YouTube has conveniently provided a downloadable form for copyright owners to notify
YouTube that their material is being infringed. 192 YouTube has taken it one step further by
developing an “Audio ID and Video ID” feature to give greater control to copyright
owners. 193 This technology allows copyright owners to send YouTube audio or video
reference files, which contain the metadata of the copyright protected materials they own.
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YouTube then takes this information and searches its databases for media matches. 194
Once a match is found, YouTube notifies the copyright owner who initially provided their
metadata to YouTube, and inquires if they want the located match monetized, tracked, or
blocked. 195 Lastly, YouTube has a “Copyright Tips” screen with links to further
information on copyright and even offers a library of authorized music for users to “liven
up” their videos without worrying that they are infringing someone else’s copyright. 196
Based on the recent decision in the Viacom v. YouTube case, it is clear that YouTube’s
precautionary measures are in compliance with what the DMCA requires. 197 Nevertheless,
this does not appear to be sufficient enough based on the high rate of copyright
infringement occurring on YouTube’s website. 198
2. Partnerships
Although a higher threshold of precautions against infringement may put some
copyright owners at ease, the fact that infringing material still makes it onto these sites at
such an alarming rate creates a feeling of injustice. 199 It is evident that ISPs continue to
benefit financially from the infringing material located on their servers, even though this
benefit actually belongs to the copyright owners. 200 A possible solution to the battle
between the copyright owners and the ISPs is to promote partnerships or agreements
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between the two, thereby allowing both parties to profit from the material. Looking to
YouTube as an example again, the website currently has a partnership program in place
where qualified copyright owners team up with YouTube to create “channels.” The owners
of these channels share in the profits YouTube makes off of the advertising posted to these
channels. 201 One of the most well known channels is VEVO. VEVO as a group, was
established as a partnership between SONY Music Entertainment, Universal Music Group
and Abu Dhabi Media. 202 Other leading music companies license material to VEVO to
broadcast across the Internet. 203 VEVO entered into a partnership with YouTube where
they share in the advertising profits. 204 This partnership illustrates how both parties can
potentially coexist while maximizing both of their economic gains. YouTube benefits from
VEVO’s music videos because YouTube’s users generally prefer the high-quality video on
the VEVO channel as opposed to the poorer quality infringing videos. 205 The owners’ of
the VEVO channel benefit from the partnership because it increases the amount of
exposure and viewership its videos receive. 206 This partnership currently appears to be
working out well. Is it possible that a similar agreement could be made between YouTube
and Viacom? The problem with these agreements and partnerships is that it may just be
limited to certain copyrights. For example, a song generally lasts for three to five minutes
long. Most YouTube visitors will watch a “video” to listen to an entire song. Whereas
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with television and full length films, most YouTube visitors are just looking for a quick
clip such as the winning touchdown or a funny punch line. As a result, it would be
difficult for corporations who own the television and film rights to partner with YouTube
to develop channels and only select certain clips to be placed on their specific channel.
Furthermore, creating these agreements is difficult and complex. The idea of “working
together” may be too good to be true, or limited to certain industries.

3. Ideas on the Horizon
Another way that ISPs can protect themselves from lawsuits against copyright holders is
through the novel idea of Internet insurance. As previously stated, it is not the service provider
that is doing the infringing but generally a third party user. With the excessive growth of the
Internet and the potential for more lawsuits to arise, ISPs will inevitably need somewhere to turn
to protect their financial interests. For argument’s sake, let’s assume that the Second Circuit
reverses the lower court’s ruling in Viacom v. YouTube and holds YouTube liable for a billion
dollars in damages to Viacom (what Viacom is alleging). 207 A holding such as this could deplete
nearly all of YouTube’s assets and mean financial ruin for YouTube as a company. From here,
the idea of Internet insurance arises. The current field of protection afforded to ISPs consists of:
Any content on [web]site[s] has the potential to raise issues about
copyright and trademark infringement as well as defamation and invasion
of privacy issues. Often an offline liability policy will not cover online
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applications.
Furthermore, sites that provide information such as
financial information, health-related information, indeed virtually any sort
of information that visitors may rely on can be subject to claims. These
claims against the owner can arise whether the owner is the creator of that
content or a licensee of some third party content. As with the offline
world, any acquisition agreements with writers, artists, licensors and
others should contain appropriate warranties and indemnities but these are
often illusory if the warrantor has no or little assets to protect the owner.
Thus the need for insurance arises. 208
In order to protect oneself from major losses, a variety of insurances have acted as
societal cogs. When individuals have money attached to themselves, they take out a life
insurance policy to make sure those around them benefit. When profitable buildings open,
they take out liability insurance to protect them from natural disasters. The current
situation for ISPs should be looked at no differently. Some of the most profitable
businesses in the world are now run through the Internet, it only makes sense for there to be
Internet insurance readily available.
Umbrella insurance 209 through an established insurance company may not be a
functional solution.

The ability to insure for large financial losses means not only having

the money to do so, but also the willingness to take large financial hits. 210 Profitable
insurance companies may not want to take such a risk. A number of insurers, including
AIG, Chubb, CIGNA, CNA, Liberty Mutual, St. Paul, Zurich, and underwriters in the
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London market have issued policies providing both first and third party insurance coverage
in an attempt to meet the market demand. As policyholders increase their presence on the
Internet, more insurers will enter the field either through stand-alone Internet-specific
policies or custom endorsements. 211
The likelihood of Internet insurance immediately becoming a reliable insurance
staple remains a challenge. First, Internet insurance must be different from most other
insurances. Life, car and health insurance all have a large pool of applicants where money
is made and then distributed. 212 Insurance policies use the “law of large numbers,” which
states, “the more members in an insured group, the more likely it is that the number of
actual losses will be very close to the number of expected losses.” 213 Insurance policies
also have premiums, which will cover the anticipated losses and are calculated using
statistics on the probability of loss for each type of insurance offered. 214 Current market
Internet insurance policies come in great variety and no one policy has yet to set the
industry standard. 215 A majority of these policies do not adhere to the prototypical
umbrella style policy and instead insure “specific, explicitly defined risks.” 216 Amongst
the few current cyber liability policies out there, they generally cover the traditional
offenses, which have been discussed above. However, these policies have not yet become
widespread and would be difficult to obtain for a company as large as YouTube who could
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presumably ask for an insurance recovery in the amount of hundreds of millions of
dollars. 217
Internet activities expose a policyholder to both traditional and rapidly emerging
new risks. Internet-related liabilities and insurance coverage for these liabilities will
continue to evolve both through court decisions interpreting traditional policies and the
insurance industry's attempts to develop new coverage to meet demand. Once a
policyholder's risk and potential coverage gaps are identified, the new Internet [insurance]
policies may be important risk management tools for Internet-related exposures. 218
Given the ever-changing culture of the Internet and as evidenced by the above
findings, a statistic based insurance policy may be too overwhelming for a typical
insurance company to carry. The lack of uncertainty brings about an alternative
suggestion originating from the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (“SIPC”). The
SIPC restores funds to investors with assets in the hands of bankrupt firms and otherwise
financially troubled brokerage firms. 219 The actual SIPC fund is financed by:
Annual assessments on all member firms – periodically set by SIPC and
interest generated from its investments in U.S. Treasury notes. If the
SIPC fund becomes or appears to be insufficient to carry out the purposes
of Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA), SIPC may borrow up to $1
billion from the U.S. Treasury through SEC (i.e., SEC would borrow the
funds from the U.S. Treasury and then re-lend them to SIPC).
In
addition, SIPC has a $1 billion line of credit with a consortium of
banks. 220
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What if there was an SIPC for online service providers? Hypothetically speaking,
the Internet Service Provider Protection Corporation (“ISPPC”). Perhaps the government
uses a model similar to the one they enacted with the SIPC and modifies to allow for largescale ISP’s to contribute a specific percentage of revenue annually to the ISPPC. The
difference between the SIPC and our fictional ISPPC is that the SIPC is used to insure
investors, while the Internet fund would be used to insure the big market service providers.
Although this idea is in its infancy, the thought of having major Internet corporations join a
fund like the ISPPC should be considered.
Due to the potential volume of damages involved in cases such as Viacom v.
YouTube , it may be best to fuse both a typical insurance premium with the ISPPC funding
model. All Internet corporations that register with the fictional fund would be required to
contribute money based on probability of lawsuits. These probabilities would come from
the same type of statistical analysis done using a traditional insurance premium. With large
Internet decisions looming, the ability to insure might aid the ability to expand.

VIII.

CONCLUSION

As society submerses itself in the social media era, the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act, and more specifically its “safe harbor provision,” provides us all with questions that need to
be answered. As this article highlights, the “safe harbor provision” has proven to be
controversial and could lead to drastic Internet service provider changes in the near future. As it
currently stands, the “safe harbor provision” has afforded ISPs a relatively low standard to elude
liability. The aforementioned solutions are meant as a framework to stimulate discussion
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throughout the legal community to develop a solution that mutually benefits both the ISP and the
copyright owner. Viacom has recently appealed the Second Circuit decision, which, allowed
YouTube to keep its impervious status as a non-infringer, begging the question, what will the
court decide?

